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1 – Introduction
Ever since I first encountered the notion of objective proba-
bility or objective chance, taken as a property of certain sys-
tems in the world, I have been troubled by a deep puzzlement 
about how to understand this idea. Consider a system or set-
up S to which we attribute an objective chance x of yielding 
outcome o
1
 and y of yielding outcome o
2
. In its crudest form, 
my puzzlement expressed itself in questions of the following 
sort: “How does system S decide when to produce outcome 
o1 and when to produce outcome o
2
?” and “How does S keep 
track of the results of previous S-chancy events, to make sure 
the frequencies of o
1
  and o
2
 build up in the right way?”  I 
immediately imagined a hidden gremlin in S that flips a coin 
(biased to the right degree, to match x and y) to determine 
which way to go.  But that clearly just postpones the puzzle-
ment momentarily; it comes right back concerning the grem-
lin’s coin flips; and anyway, gremlins and other homunculi 
are not respectable explanatory tools, in science or in philos-
ophy.
Despite the phrasing of the two questions just above, my puz-
zlement is not based on a misguided anthropomorphizing of 
chance systems, attributing to them beliefs and desires.  The 
puzzle is about how to understand a bare posit – basically, 
just assigning a set of numbers to a chance setup’s outcomes 
– as somehow able to explicate, to justify and make reason-
able, all the riches of derived mathematical consequences and 
practical applications that probability theory affords us. 
Despite years of thinking about probability and chance, I’ve 
never been able to shake the feeling that I don’t understand 
what is meant by those who postulate bare, unanalyzable and 
underived primitive objective chances, or chancy fundamen-
tal laws.  In this paper my aim is to articulate my puzzlement 
as clearly as I can, and hopefully induce some readers to 
share it.  And by exploring the dialectics of the debates be-
tween primitive chance advocates and skeptics, I will try to 
show that alternative understandings of chance, that reduce 
objective chance facts to facts of certain other kinds, are very 
much to be preferred, if they can be crafted in ways that don’t 
face insuperable difficulties of their own.  As we will see, it 
seems that this can be done in more than one way, especially 
if we assume underlying determinism.  Hence the title of this 
paper.
2 – The puzzle, in more depth
There has been widespread agreement for the past 100 years 
or so that probability is a concept that, while well-enough 
defined mathematically by various systems of axioms (e.g. 
Kolmogorov’s), is not automatically well understood when 
attributed to a situation or event in, or a proposition about, 
the real world.  Instead, probability statements are in need 
of an interpretation.  Alan Hájek’s Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (2012) article “Interpretations of Probability” 
canvasses the standard proposals that have been made for 
how to interpret all, or some parts, of our probability-talk, 
and the problems that each faces.  Most prominently, prob-
ability-talk is often cashed out in terms of the frequencies 
of certain conditions or events obtaining, or in terms of the 
degrees of belief of agents in conditions of uncertainty.  But 
since the work of Peirce at least in the early 1900s there have 
been proposals that certain types of probability-talk be taken 
as primitive and basic, not to be cashed out or interpreted 
in terms of anything else.  The idea is that there may be sin-
gle events and/or types of events that are simply, irreducibly 
chancy: indeterministic, random, and only probabilistically 
predictable, i.e., associable with specific numerical chances in 
between zero and one.  Usually, when contrasted with other 
One currently popular view about the nature of objective probabilities, or objective 
chances, is that they – or some of them, at least – are primitive features of the physical 
world, not reducible to anything else nor explicable in terms of frequencies, degrees of 
belief, or anything else.  In this paper I explore the question of what the semantic con-
tent of primitive chance claims could be.  Every attempt I look at to supply such content 
either comes up empty-handed, or begs important questions against the skeptic who 
doubts the meaningfulness of primitive chance claims. In the second half of the paper 
I show that, by contrast, there are clear, and clearly contentful, ways to understand 
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views about probability, this proposal is called the “propen-
sity interpretation”.  But this is a misnomer since the view 
is not an interpretation (= translation into other terms) so 
much as a flat-footed insistence that no interpretation in oth-
er terms can be given.1
While some philosophers find the propensity2 view intuitive 
and relatively easy to understand, others accompany me in 
being puzzled about what could be meant by the postulation 
of primitive chances.  Prominent among the puzzled are those 
who have (broadly) Humean leanings, such as van Fraassen 
or David Lewis.  In a famous passage we will examine later, 
Lewis indicated his skepticism about primitive chances by la-
beling them ‘whatnots’.  But it may be that such skepticism 
is confined to a minority of contemporary philosophers; let’s 
see whether that can be remedied.
The basic question I want to pose and explore is this: what is 
the meaning of a putative primitive chance statement?  What 
is the content of a statement such as Pr
S
(O) = .4, (where S 
is an irreducibly chancy setup or situation, and O one of the 
possible outcomes), or of a putative chancy fundamental law 
statement such as Pr
S
(G
i
) = x
i
 (where the G
i
 are the possi-
ble “outcomes” of the chance process covered by the law, and 
the x
i
 their objective chances)?  What sort of claim are these 
statements supposed to be making about the world – and 
in particular, what differentiates them from identical state-
ments with numerically different x’s on the right?  How can 
we distinguish a possible world in which Pr
S
(O) = 0.4 is true 
from one in which  Pr
S
(O) = 0.55 is true?
As we will see, it is not easy to answer these questions.  In the 
next section we will explore the dialectics of attempts to give 
answers, and then consider the arguments of those who say 
no answer need be given.
3 – The dialectics of primitive 
chance
How and why should beliefs about objective chance help to shape 
our expectations of what will happen?  This is the fundamental 
question about the concept of chance.  I am going to argue that 
within the metaphysical point of view, the question cannot be an-
swered at all. (van Fraassen 1989, p. 81)
The most powerful impetus for postulating primitive chances 
has come from the appearance in physics of an apparently 
fundamental and irreducible indeterminism in quantum the-
ories.  Outside of the realm of quantum-derived chances, the 
main type of system to which we are wont to ascribe definite, 
precise objective chances, but unwilling to consider them as 
mere frequencies, is classical gambling devices (coin flips, 
roulette wheels, card games, etc.).  But as we will discuss later 
on, most gambling devices can probably be modeled as de-
terministic systems with reliably randomly-distributed initial 
conditions, and hence not genuine loci of primitive propen-
sity-type chance.  So let’s begin the dialectic by trying to say 
what the content or meaning of a chancy-law statement could 
be.
On a traditional view of ordinary, non-probabilistic laws, one 
might say that the content of a law statement has two parts: 
an actuality-related part, and a modal part.  The former part 
makes a claim about the way things are.  Traditionally, we 
say that this part consists of a universal generalization – 
something that can be made to look something like ‘All F’s 
are G’s’.  Newton’s law of gravity can clearly be expressed in 
such a form, like so: “Whenever two solid bodies have masses 
m
1
 and m
2
 and their centers of gravity are separated by dis-
tance r, the force each body exerts on the other is  and 
directed toward the first body’s center of gravity.”  Together 
with other laws (notably F = ma) and bridge principles, this 
law describes how things evolve over time in the actual world, 
i.e., in what is often called the “Humean Mosaic”.3  And the 
same goes for all other laws that are not probabilistic.
The modal part of laws is perhaps not so clearly or uncontro-
versially understood, but is nevertheless taken to be an im-
portant part of the content.  A law of nature, we want to say, 
does not simply say that such-and-so does happen, but more-
over says that – in some appropriate sense – such-and-so 
must happen, i.e., that it is in some sense necessary.  Tradi-
tional accounts have never delivered a plausible and accept-
able explication of this alleged necessity.  Logical necessity 
seems too strong to most philosophers.  “Metaphysical” ne-
cessity strikes most philosophers as too strong to be the right 
modality also, and it has the additional drawback of being a 
controversial notion in its own right.  Jumping to the far end 
of the spectrum, most philosophers are also not content to 
dismiss or internalize the modality, making it a mere matter 
of our attitudes and habits – though a long tradition begin-
Objective chance: 
nOt prOpensity, 
maybe determinism
1 - In this paper I will indicate the target using phrases like “the propensity view”, or “primitive chances” or “fundamental chancy laws”, as appropriate given the 
context. 
2 - The clearest example is to be found in Giere (1973); earlier papers by Popper are often cited but, in my opinion, contain confusions about the locus of propensities 
and their connection to long-run frequencies. The same is true of Peirce; see Suárez (2013) for extensive discussion.
3 - The Humean Mosaic (HM) is basically everything that happens, throughout all space and time.  It is meant to include the objective description of all situations at 
all places and times, in terms of “occurrent” properties – that is, excluding purely dispositional properties, powers, necessitation relations (if any) between events, 
and other such things about which Humeans are notoriously skeptical.  The HM is easier to imagine in line with a classical-physics worldview. It could contain 
point-particle trajectories, mass density distributions over space and time, charge distributions, scalar and vector fields, and so forth.  It can contain things like 
colors and beliefs also, if we have a way of reducing them to non-dispositional properties on (parts of) the mosaic.  Since primitive propensities are usually thought 
of as a type of disposition, they are of course not to be found in the Mosaic, according to Humeans at least; and the point of the present dialectic is precisely to see 
if there is a way, indirectly or directly, to understand what it would be for the HM of a world to contain chance propensities.
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ning with Hume and continuing today pursues this option.4
 
So most non-Humean philosophers who believe in laws of na-
ture at all would like to ascribe them an intermediate-strength 
modality: physical necessity.  How physical necessity should 
be understood is a thorny issue, which we need not explore. 
But it is worth noticing that philosophers and physicists at 
least make attempts, from time to time, to provide a deeper 
account of the nature and source of the physical necessity of 
laws.  In recent analytic philosophy it has become fashionable 
again to argue that the necessity of physical laws is ground-
ed in the essential natures of the basic physical kinds, and 
their powers or dispositions.  Without an illuminating further 
account of these notions (essence, power, nature), of course, 
this is a relatively shallow account, and one that Humeans 
will reject.  But it is something.  As Filomeno (2014) discuss-
es, there are much less shallow – though still highly specula-
tive, and not yet successful – attempts at times by physicists 
to give a derivation of the necessity of the physical laws of our 
world.  The point of mentioning such efforts is that they show 
that, when it comes to the modal aspect of laws, it seems at 
least conceivable that a substantial reductive account could 
be given, even if none has yet been achieved.
Whether or not any such programme of explaining or deriv-
ing the necessity of laws of nature proves workable, though, 
philosophers will presumably not despair about non-chancy 
laws of nature, and for a perfectly good reason.  At least part 
of the content of law claims seems clear: the part that says 
what actually is the case.  Now, what about chancy laws?
We might expect that chancy laws also have two sides to their 
content:  actuality-related and modal.  Van Fraassen (1980, 
ch. 6) and others certainly think of objective probability as 
involving a new sort of modality, intermediate between pos-
sibility and necessity, and equipped with its own logical rules, 
namely the probability calculus.  So let’s see if we can sepa-
rate out the actuality-related and modal parts of the content 
of a probabilistic law.
Just as regular laws have a canonical logical form, “All F’s 
are G’s”, probabilistic laws will have a canonical form too: 
Pr(G
i
|S) = x
i
, or perhaps Pr
S
(G
i
) = x
i
.  As above, the G
i
 are the 
possible “outcomes” of the chance process covered by the law, 
and the law gives us their objective chances.
Let’s consider first the modal content of such laws.  Do we 
understand it?  It is not supposed to be mere possibility; true, 
we generally take it that any of the outcomes G
i
 that have 
non-zero chance are “possible”, but that is not what we take 
to be the real story.  The real modal part is supposed to have 
something to do with the number x
i
, and be “stronger” the 
closer x
i
 is to 1.  What is this modality that comes in a con-
tinuum of relative strengths?  Do we capture it by saying, for 
example, “Since Pr(G
1
) is twice as large as Pr(G
2
), it is twice 
as possible.”?   No - this is meaningless.  Possibility itself does 
not come in degrees; an event is either possible, or it is not. 
Probability or “likelihood” does come in degrees, but proba-
bility, in the primitive-chance sense here at issue, is precisely 
what we are trying to analyze or interpret.
The intended modality here is often, in a loose way, cashed 
out in terms of a counterfactual – a statement about what 
would happen.  The kind of thing we want to say goes like 
this: “If the S conditions were to be instantiated repeatedly, 
in a large number of causally independent “trials”, then G
i
 
would be the outcome in approximately an x
i
 fraction of the 
trials.”  We say this, but then we immediately take it back: “Of 
course, this need not always happen; it is simply very likely 
to occur, with higher and higher probability as the number 
of trials increases.”  But now our counterfactual explication 
of the modal content of the law is in trouble.  We will require 
an explication of the meaning of this new probability claim 
– both its actuality-related part (if it has any), and its modal 
part – and it is easy to see that we will be mired in an endless 
regress.  So, the modal part of a chancy law does not seem to 
have any clear content.  We want to be able to cash it out in 
terms of something about what would – definitely – happen 
in certain circumstances, but we cannot.
Digression: a way to cash out modal content?
There is one more way to try to cash out the modal part of 
chancy laws’ content, which has been explored in different 
ways by authors such as McCall (1994), Fetzer and Nute 
(1979), Giere (1976) and Pollock (1990).  The idea is to an-
alyze the objective chance as being some sort of proportion, 
among the branches representing possible futures of our 
world (McCall), among possible but non-actual “objects” or 
trials (Pollock), or among possible worlds (Giere, Fetzer).  The 
idea seems promising at first: provide a non-empty semantic 
content for propensity ascriptions, one that at the same time 
makes clear the modal aspect of that content!  Unfortunately, 
this rosy prospect endures only for as long as it takes to spell 
out one (any one) of these modal-proportion proposals.
 
Pollock proposed to identify Pr(A|S) = x with <The propor-
tion of physically possible S’s that are A’s is x>.  We are to 
imagine a number of possible worlds, sharing the laws of 
our world, in which the relevant setup or conditions S are 
instantiated; and the proportion of those worlds in which A 
results is the objective probability we are trying to explicate. 
Based on Pollock’s theory, we might say that the modal con-
tent of primitive chance statements is this: a fraction x of  all 
(relevant) possible S- worlds are A- worlds.  McCall, by con-
4 - Lewis’ (1994) approach to laws, which we will briefly see below, eschews imputing any primitive modal status to laws, but also avoids internalizing the 
modality (or tries to do so at least).  Lawhood is analyzed as membership in a “Best System”, i.e. set of laws or axioms for our world (see below for explanation). For 
Lewis, laws are then granted a kind of modal strength via their role in determining the truth values of various counterfactuals.  Whatever its defects, the Lewisian 
approach leaves both the factual and the modal content of laws completely clear.
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trast, proposes that we think of reality as having (literally?) 
a branching-tree structure, where the past up to now is the 
trunk and the branches sprouting from now towards the fu-
ture represent possible ways things can go.  In the branching 
structure, there will generally be multiple A-branches and 
multiple branches for the other possible outcomes of the S 
setup; the objective chance of A in S is then identified with the 
proportion of A-branches out of the total number of branch-
es starting with future chancy setup S.  The diagram below, 
adapted from van Fraassen (1989, p. 84), illustrates Mc-
Call’s proposal.  Fetzer and Giere also propose accounts that 
equate, in some sense or other, primitive chances with ratios 
or proportions or relative weights of sets of possible worlds.5
Figure 1: The horizontal-vertical problem
These explications of chance each have internal difficulties, 
some or all of which were discussed back in the 1970s when 
most of these works were done.  But in addition, as a genre 
they face a few difficulties that seem to me insuperable. 
In order to capture chances that take on any real value (i.e., 
irrational numbers,  as well as rationals such as 1/3), the au-
thors are forced to posit infinite structures (in some cases 
countable, in others, continua).  But ratios in infinite sets are 
notoriously problematic, being either undefined or requir-
ing ad hoc assumptions or additions to the structure.  Giere 
(1976), for example, ends up using continua in his semantic 
constructions, and positing ad hoc weight functions over sets 
of possible worlds.6
 
But the worst problem that all these proposals run into is 
what van Fraassen called the horizontal-vertical problem. 
What these proposals give us is a ratio when we “cut across” 
the relevant structure of possibilities horizontally, as in the 
diagram above.  But the actual world is just one path through 
that upward branching tree, or one world in the whole set 
of possible worlds.  In order for objective chances to guide 
our expectations in the way we want, we need to be sure they 
reflect, as appropriate, the vertical frequency of A’s in S-situ-
ations, the frequency found in the actual world.  What reason 
do we have to think that the horizontal ratios or measures of-
fered by these accounts are indicative of the vertical frequen-
cies in the real world?
This last issue touches on a key aspect of the dialectics of 
primitive chances that we will explore further shortly.  For 
now, though, we just need to take away the following upshot. 
Various authors have attempted to cash out the meaning 
of propensity-type chance claims in terms of ratios among 
sets of possible worlds or possible objects. But the elaborate 
mathematical constructions they created for this task all end 
up not being something we can take literally and seriously as 
ontology, and at best they serve as structures in which one 
can find a way to embed and represent the numerical chances 
that we started out wanting to understand.  They do not fulfil 
the task of letting us understand the modal part of the con-
tent of primitive chance claims, and even if they did, it would 
remain a mystery why the chances so defined should tell us 
anything about what will happen in the actual world.
End digression
Perhaps, as we found with non-chancy laws, at least the ac-
tuality-related content of a chancy law statement is clear? 
Unfortunately, it is not.  Or at least, nothing capturing the 
numerical aspect appears to be in the offing.  The actuali-
ty-related part cannot be merely the claim that whenever con-
ditions S are instantiated, one of the G
i
 results.7 That would 
not capture the numerical content of the x
i
. But we equally 
well know we cannot take the law to be saying that, in actual 
cases where S is instantiated, a proportion x
i
 of the outcomes 
are G
i
.  An actual frequentist, (the simplest Humean), can say 
this, but not the propensity advocate.  The actual frequen-
cies may – in general, we expect, they will – diverge from the 
objective probabilities, especially when the number of actu-
al cases in all of history is low.  But if not this, then what is 
the actuality-related content of a chancy law?  As far as I can 
see, there is none - nothing that is clear, true, and captures in 
some way the numerical-strength aspect of the chances.  Or-
dinary laws of nature, on a straightforward realist approach, 
have a clear-cut actuality-related content, and a modal con-
5-  Of these authors, although all four purport in some sense to be providing the meaning (or at least the ‘semantics’) of propensity ascriptions, once the apparati have been 
presented only McCall seems to offer his in a serious vein, and about even his account I am not sure how literally we are meant to take it.  Giere and Pollock both characterize 
their formal constructions as merely heuristic devices, and assure the reader that their framework of possible worlds/objects and measures over sets of them is not to be taken 
literally, but merely as a tool to represent propensity facts in a mathematically useful form. 
6 - Giere essentially concedes the points I am making in his summary (p. 332), writing: “Metaphysically speaking, then, what are physical propensities? They are weights over 
physically possible final states of stochastic trials - weights that generate a probability distribution over sets of states. The function u provides only a formal and rather shallow 
analysis of this distribution. But is it not just the task of a propensity interpretation to explain what these weights are? No, because it cannot be done.”  The reader is left frankly 
puzzled about why an elaborate formal apparatus was needed, if in the end it is not to be taken seriously and does not shed any actual light on what it means to say that ‘S has a 
propensity of 0.x to give rise to A’.
7 - In fact, even this is not necessarily so; the coin may, after all, land on its edge. 
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tent that remains obscure.  But chancy laws, on a straightfor-
ward realist approach, have no clear content of either sort.8
In order to try to find the content of chance law statements, I 
divided the search into two parts, one actuality-based and one 
modal; and we found it difficult to identify any clear content 
of either sort.  But perhaps the problem is not with chance 
laws, but rather this proposed division of content itself.  What 
happens if we go looking for the content of chance-giving laws 
simpliciter, without trying to split the modal from the actual/
factual?  I see no new options on the horizon.  It seems that if 
we cannot offer a translation of (part or all of) the content of 
a chance-law claim into something about frequencies of out-
comes, we must instead stick to the notion of the probability 
of those outcomes.  But this is just to leave un-explicated the 
very notion whose meaningfulness is at issue.
Now is the time to tackle head-on the likely primitivist re-
sponse to the above: the whole search for a translation of the 
meaning of chance claims or chance laws in terms of some-
thing else was misguided.  The whole point of positing objec-
tive chances or chance laws as a primitive is to make clear that 
it’s not possible to give an explication in terms of something 
else.  Nor is it needed; we (most of us!) understand perfectly 
well what is meant in making claims about objective chances, 
how to verify or falsify them, and how to use those claims. 
As Maudlin asks, “What more, exactly, could be wanted?”.9 
With this we enter phase 2 of the dialectics.
Let’s start with the primitivism espoused by Elliott Sober, 
which he calls the “No-theory theory” of probability.  The ba-
sic idea of the no-theory theory is that, in some cases at least, 
objective probability is not analyzable in other terms, and in-
stead are a perfectly respectable theoretical concept.  And like 
many important theoretical concepts, probability may not be 
definable in terms of other concepts, yet be perfectly well im-
plicitly defined by its role in the theories that use it. 
Sober (2010) offers us the analogy of the concept of (iner-
tial) mass in physics.  Despite the absence of a clean and clear 
definition, we believe that mass is an objective property of 
many physical objects, and for good reasons.  For example, 
we have various different techniques for measuring or esti-
mating mass, and they converge satisfactorily in most appli-
cations.  The best explanation of this convergence is that it 
is due to a common cause, namely, that there is an objective 
property of mass (or rather: a certain quantity of mass) in the 
objects being measured.  So even though we might consider 
that inertial mass is an unobservable property, perhaps even 
an intrinsically dispositional property, we can have perfectly 
respectable grounds for believing in its existence.
I find Sober’s use of the theoretical concept of mass as an 
analogy for propensity-type probability unpersuasive.  Mass 
is a property that, for a wide range of values, can be directly 
(if roughly) judged by human senses, and accurately mea-
sured with easily portable devices (e.g. scales).  If a wide class 
of objective probabilities could be rapidly and accurately es-
timated by simple devices that we (say) insert the chance set-
ups into10, then there would no doubt be a widespread and 
generalized sentiment among philosophers and scientists 
that the lack of an explicit theory was no serious obstacle to 
believing in the objective reality of probabilities. 
But, of course, the real situation is quite different.  There are 
no such devices.  Moreover, there is no way to mount the sort 
of common-cause argument that Sober invokes as grounds 
for believing in the unobservable quantitative property of 
mass.  When it comes to chances, we have exactly one way 
of measuring them: by looking at frequencies in (what we 
hope are) repeated instances of identical setups.11  Everybody 
believes in mass and in its objectivity, even if a few periph-
eral applications are disputable.  But among philosophers of 
probability, and scientists and statisticians who use it, there 
are substantial numbers who don’t believe the concept picks 
out any objective reality at all (over and above actual fre-
quencies).  This sociological difference reflects the very real 
disanalogies between the concept of mass and the concept of 
primitive chance.
But if Sober’s analogy is not quite convincing on its own, we 
still have to face the fact that many primitivists feel that they 
perfectly well understand the meaning of claims like  ‘Pr(G
i
|S) 
= x
i
,’ and add that we understand both how to use them and 
how to confirm or disconfirm them.  How could that be so, if 
my claim that we don’t understand primitive chance claims 
were correct?
The key to this part of the dialectics is the Principal Principle: 
the primitivists are relying on it, implicitly or explicitly, but 
the skeptic says they have no right to do so.
We can express one version of the PP in symbols, as follows. 
Let Cr(_|_) be a rational subjective probability function 
(credence function), A be a proposition in the domain of 
8 - The qualification “on a straightforward realist approach” here is meant to exclude approaches to laws that demote them to something essentially to do with 
humans, e.g. instrumentalism, “inference-ticket” accounts, etc; and also to exclude Humean reductive accounts of laws such as that in Lewis (1994).
9 - Maudlin (2007), “What could be objective about probabilities?”.
10 - There is a class of objective chance setups for which we seem able to judge the chances rapidly and accurately: classical gambling devices for which we feel 
we can deduce the chances on the basis of symmetry considerations.  But this is a matter of inferring, not measuring; and as I will argue later, such systems are 
probably best understood as possessing objective probabilities grounded in determinism plus initial-condition facts, not primitive propensities.
11 - That said, with the advent of QM we have a new technique for coming to know certain objective chances: namely, deriving them from quantum wave functions, 
cross-sections and so forth.  (Something similar is true for probabilities given by classical statistical mechanics, but for most philosophers those are not considered 
candidates for being fundamental or primitive chances.) This novelty strengthens the grounds for considering QM chances to be objective and mind-independent, 
but does not at all resolve the puzzle about what propensity-type chance claims could mean.
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an objective chance function P(__), E be the rest of the 
agent’s background knowledge, assumed to be “admissi-
ble” with respect to A, and X be the proposition stating 
that P(A) = x. Then:
(PP)  Cr(A|XE) = x
If a rational agent believes herself to know the objective prob-
ability of A, P(A) = x, then that will be her subjective degree 
of belief in A, conditional on that fact.  If x is near 1, the agent 
confidently expects A to be true; if x is low, the agent confi-
dently plans on A not coming out true; and so forth. 
Plugging primitive chance probabilities into PP gives us the 
feeling that we understand the actuality-related content of 
the chance law: it is telling us that we should have such-and-
so degrees of belief, so-and-such expectations for sets of re-
peated trials, etc.  The PP is also used, implicitly, when we 
go from facts about frequencies in repeated trials to beliefs 
about what the objective chances are.  We become 95 % con-
fident, e.g., that the objective chance is within 0.1 of x after 
seeing a frequency of x in a certain number of trials.  This 
subjective probability is justified (if it is justified!) by the fact 
that it comes out of application of PP.  So it seems that the 
primitivists are right after all: PP supplies the missing con-
tent to primitive chance statements, and its tacit invocation 
explains why most philosophers have felt it obvious that such 
statements do indeed make clear and contentful claims about 
the world.  But as the quote from van Fraassen at the start 
of this section indicated, to say how and why beliefs about 
primitive chances should shape our expectations about what 
will happen appears to be impossible.
Here we arrive at a crucial step in the dialectics of primitive 
chance, and there are two points that I want to make.
First, from the response on behalf of primitivism we are now 
considering, it would seem that the appeal to PP is carrying 
the entire weight of providing content to primitive chance 
claims. That means that we are being asked to entertain that 
the whole meaning of such statements is carried by their (al-
leged) claim to rationally constrain our subjective credences. 
In other words, the content of such statements amounts to 
some facts about how rational agents should constrain their 
degrees of belief – i.e., normative facts.  But this means that 
the content seems to fall on the wrong side of the fact/value 
divide.
More to the point, and this is the second and decisive re-
sponse, we have just traded one mystery for a slightly-differ-
ent one.  If it is a fact that rational agents should conform 
their credences to the values of the primitive chances – if they 
can come to know the latter, at least – then this ought to be 
true because of some feature or property that the primitive 
chances possess!  And the connection cannot just be blindly 
asserted; it needs to be established by argument or demon-
stration. 
 
Now is the time to come back to the famous quote from Lewis 
mentioned earlier.  Referring to the possibility of positing in-
trinsically probabilistic dispositions, i.e. chance propensities, 
Lewis writes:
Be my guest – posit all the primitive unHumean whatnots you 
like.  (I only ask that your alleged truths should supervene on 
being).  But play fair in naming your whatnots.  Don’t call any 
alleged feature of reality ‘chance’ unless you’ve already shown 
that you have something, knowledge of which could constrain 
rational credence. (1994, p. 484).
The problem is that there is no way for the advocate of prim-
itive chances to meet this challenge.  Their alleged primitive 
chances, precisely by being bare primitives, lack any content 
beyond their numerical values.  And being told that a system 
S has a whatnot-property G such that S’s future possible be-
havior O has a numerical G-value x tells us nothing whatsoev-
er that can or should clearly constrain our rational credences 
concerning O’s occurrence or non-occurrence.12 
To some philosophers it seems clear that the challenge here 
laid down to the advocate of primitive chances is unfair.  Hall 
responds to Lewis’s challenge thus:
What I ‘have’ are objective chances, which, I assert, are simply 
an extra ingredient of metaphysical reality, not to be ‘reduced’ 
to anything else.  What’s more, it is just a basic conceptual truth 
about chance that it is the sort of thing, knowledge of which con-
strains rational credence.  Of course, it is a further question – one 
that certainly cannot be answered definitively from the armchair 
– whether nature provides anything that answers to our concept 
of chance.  But we have long since learned to live with such mod-
est sceptical worries.  And at any rate, they are irrelevant to the 
question at issue, which is whether my primitivist position can 
‘rationalize’ the Principal Principle.  The answer, manifestly, is 
that it can: for, again, it is part of my position that this princi-
ple states an analytic truth about chance and rational credence. 
(2004, p. 106).
Hall’s response to the challenge has, it seems to me, all the 
virtues of theft over honest toil.  This form of argument is not 
one that we should be happy to extend to other areas of phil-
osophical debate.  Consider a debate between philosophers 
who posit a conscious mind, but one side considers it clear 
that conscious minds are non-physical, while the other doubts 
this and asks for a demonstration.  “It is just a basic concep-
tual truth about conscious minds that they are non-physical 
12 - Here I have used the letter ‘G’ instead of ‘P’ because we are so used to using ‘P’ for ‘probability’, and the legitimacy of that association is precisely what is at issue. In case you 
feel that it is still somehow obvious or compelling that the G-values should be understood as chances, notice that nothing in the bare notion of G-values tells us to take them as 
probabilities vs taking them as (1 – probabilities),  or any of a myriad of other possible interpretations.
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things.  Of course, it is a further question – one that certainly 
cannot be answered definitively from the armchair – whether 
nature actually contains conscious minds.  But we have long 
since learned to live with such modest sceptical worries.”  The 
opponent will regard this move as a cheat, and feel that while 
we have plenty of evidence that something deserving the ep-
ithet ‘conscious mind’ exists, it is far from obvious that it is 
a non-physical thing (whatever that might mean, something 
about which the opponent will no doubt ask for clarification). 
Mutatis mutandis, this is the perspective I maintain concern-
ing objective chance.
There is one more turn of the dialectical wheel to consider 
before we move on.  While Hall’s move may cross the lines of 
fair play, as Lewis thought, there is a somewhat more mod-
est way of postulating objective chances that does not.  In his 
(1995) The Facts of Causation, Hugh Mellor postulates what 
he takes to be something like the propensity theorist’s objec-
tive chances, but he explicitly defines such chances as that 
feature of reality, whatever it may be, that fits our conceptual 
notion of chance, especially in the PP role of being such as 
to rationally constrain credence.  Mellor’s move differs from 
Hall’s in a crucial respect: it leaves open the possibility that 
something other than a primitive feature of reality – some-
thing, that is, that might satisfy the reductivist desires of 
Lewis – could turn out to be what “objective chance” actually 
refers to.
What Lewis (1994) tried to show is that this is in fact the case: 
a reductive story concerning the notion of objective chance 
can be told, along Humean Best System lines, which suc-
ceeds in capturing most of what we ever wanted the notion 
of chance to do for us.  Hoefer (2007) and Frigg and Hoefer 
(2015) develop a pragmatic version of such a Humean theo-
ry, and show explicitly that ‘objective chance’ as so defined 
should constrain rational credence in just the way captured 
by PP. 
Rather than explaining my or Lewis’ Humean approach in 
detail, what I want to do in the rest of this paper is give fur-
ther motivation for rejecting the primitive chance approach 
by showing how easily objective probabilities can arise in the 
context of underlying fully deterministic laws.  It is an open 
possibility, as we will see, that perhaps all objective chances 
can be seen as arising in this way.
4 – Chances from Determin-
ism: the Solution?
Why do some philosophers postulate the existence of primi-
tive, irreducible “extra ingredients” of reality, over and above 
the non-controversial physical things like tables and chairs 
and human bodies?  In most cases, they are making a move 
of inference to the best explanation (IBE).  In the case of pro-
pensities or chance laws, the explanandum is supposed to be 
the existence in our world of stable probabilistic regularities 
associated with certain kinds of physical situations or setups. 
By ‘stable probabilistic regularities’ what I mean is: patterns 
of frequencies, in medium-to-large collections of instantia-
tions of the relevant setup kind, of the type that one expects 
(via PP) given certain objective probabilities.
In a recent paper on chance and determinism, Nina Emery 
(2015) discusses this sort of claim, that chances (including, 
presumably, primitive chances) may be posited in order to 
explain facts about event frequencies.  Her discussion centers 
on a “paradigm case” of objective chance, the up-deflection 
probability of silver atoms passed through a Stern-Gerlach 
device.  The silver atoms in Emery’s paradigm case have 
previously been prepared in a deflected-up state along axis 
x by previous measurement interaction, and subsequent-
ly are measured along axis x’ which is not far from x, so the 
quantum probability of upward deflection is high, and indeed 
most atoms are deflected up.  Emery stipulates that no hid-
den variable differentiates the prepared silver atoms in a way 
that could explain specific outcomes; this stipulation is part 
of what makes it her “paradigm case”.  Turning to explana-
tion, Emery writes:
[There is a] more general claim which, given the observations 
she has made, is liable to be part of Sally’s best theory about the 
experimental set-up:
(5) The chance of any silver atom in the experiment being de-
flected up is very high.
And (5) demonstrates that in addition to claims about frequency 
providing evidence for claims about chance, claims about chance 
can also, at least sometimes, explain claims about frequencies. 
In particular, (5) explains (6):
(6) Most of the silver atoms in the experiment have been de-
flected up.
That (5) explains (6) may not [be/sic] immediately obvious, but 
the argument for it is straightforward.  First, notice that if (5) 
does not explain (6), then nothing does.  It is part of the para-
digm case that there is no feature such that all and only silver 
atoms that are deflected up have that feature before they are sent 
through the magnets.  What else, then, could explain the fact that 
most of the silver atoms sent through the experiment are deflect-
ed up? What other sort of fact could be provided as answer to the 
question, ‘Why have most of the silver atoms in the experiment 
been deflected up?’  Second, notice that if nothing explains (6), 
then we have no reason for expecting the pattern described in (6) 
to continue.  If it is just a massive coincidence that most of the 
silver atoms sent through the experiment have been deflected up, 
then we should not expect the next silver atom to be deflected 
up. But, we do expect the next silver atom to be deflected up, 
and most of the silver atoms after that.  So we expect the pattern 
described in (6) to continue.  So something explains (6). And the 
only possible explanation is (5).
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There are a number of ways to resist Emery’s argument and 
her conclusion. Some empiricists (though not I) would dis-
pute her claim that if we believe nothing explains the exis-
tence of a certain regularity, then we have no reason to expect 
it to persist.  Moreover, it is controversial whether primitive 
chances do provide an explanation of stable probabilistic reg-
ularities.  Emery’s explanans and explanandum are worded 
fairly vaguely, presumably deliberately, so as to accommo-
date the potential gap between the chance and the observed 
actual frequency.  But the wiggle room between primitive 
chances and frequencies, which in principle has no bounds, 
can be as much foe as friend to the explanation-based de-
fense of primitive chance.  For example, suppose that the ac-
tual frequency behind Emery’s (6) is 97%, but the quantum 
chance is supposed to be only 89%.  If that frequency is built 
up over many thousands of silver atoms, then standard sta-
tistical practice would be to regard this frequency as strongly 
disconfirming, if not outright refuting, the hypothesis that 
the objective chance is in fact 89%.  As the frequency gets fur-
ther and further away from the putative objective chance, in-
tuitively, the alleged explanation of the frequency by  chance 
gets worse and worse, eventually becoming no explanation 
at all; but the (null) semantic content of a primitive chance 
claim gives us no clue about how to justify or quantify this in-
tuitive claim.  This brings us back to the considerations of the 
first sections of this paper, which can be read as an extended 
argument that primitive chance claims cannot explain actual 
frequencies or our expectations about them, because (i) we 
don’t know what the semantic content of primitive chance 
claims could be, and (ii) we have no justification for plugging 
them into PP to generate subjective expectations.  
But setting aside all these objections, what I want to address 
now is the following question.  Even if primitive chances pro-
vide a possible explanation for stable probabilistic regulari-
ties, are they in fact the best explanation?  I will argue that 
they are not: deterministic underpinnings do the explanatory 
job at least as well, or better.  
There are at least two different routes for extracting objective 
probabilities from underlying deterministic mechanics.  But 
at a certain level of description the basic idea for both routes 
is the same: if the dynamics of a system is such that small 
differences in initial conditions lead to very big differences in 
the “output” state, then an enormously wide variety of distri-
butions of such initial conditions (over the relevant space of 
possible initial conditions for the type of system) will all lead 
to approximately the same stable probabilistic regularities in 
the outputs of the system.13
This basic idea is well illustrated by a very simple, determin-
istic coin-flip situation, as modeled in (Diaconis, Holmes and 
Montgomery 2007).  In their mathematical coin flip model, 
which they also implement experimentally, whether a coin 
initially placed heads-up into the coin flipping mechanism 
will land heads depends deterministically on two variables, 
the initial upward velocity and the initial rate of rotation 
(spinning), as illustrated in their diagram below.  If the initial 
conditions (IC’s) fall into a shaded area, the coin lands heads; 
if they fall in a white area, it lands tails.  Note that the area 
of the shaded regions, in the magnified region of IC space, is 
approximately the same as the area of the white regions:
Figure 2: Hyperbolas as defined by the various initial values 
of ω.
Now imagine that the initial conditions of coin flips all fall 
in a blob-shaped sub-area of the square region magnified 
in their diagram.  Suppose further – as is actually the case, 
presumably, in real coin flips – that it is difficult to con-
trol exactly where the initial condition of a flip lies, in this 
region, and hence that the pattern of actual initial condi-
tions, when real people flip coins (say) 100 times, looks 
like 100 points scattered randomly over that blob-shaped 
sub-area.  Being so scattered in a random-looking way, 
uncorrelated with the bands of shaded or un-shaded re-
gions, about half of the flip IC’s will fall in a shaded region, 
and half in a white region.  This yields, and explains, the 
50% chance of heads we commonly ascribe to coin flips.14
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13 - This basic idea goes back at least to work by Poincaré (1896/1912) and has been developed and extended to many concrete systems in subsequent decades.   The “wide variety 
of distributions” on initial conditions mentioned above, which all yield essentially the same macroscopic statistical behavior, is reflected in Poincaré’s name for the phenomenon: 
the “method of arbitrary functions”. (Though it is not strictly true that the normal statistical behavior emerges for arbitrary functions.)
14 - Why should the distribution of IC’s over the blob-shaped area be random-looking and not correlated with the hyperbolic-shaped bands?  Aside from the fact already mentio-
ned, that it is hard for us to control the IC precisely, there need be no answer to this; it just so happens that real coin flips do display this lack of correlation.  (And the same holds 
for the IC’s of many other deterministic systems that amplify small IC-differences into large macro-outcome differences.)
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Figure 3: Hyperbolas as defined by the various initial values 
of ω.
In the second diagram, we depict a blob in which all the actu-
al coin flip IC’s fall.  We may wonder: if we approximate the 
distribution of such points over that region of IC-space with 
a continuous probability density, what will that function look 
like? Will it be a uniform distribution, or peaked near the cen-
ter, or some other distribution entirely?  Given the approxi-
mately equal areas of white and shaded bands inside the blob, 
a uniform distribution guarantees the expected 50/50 prob-
ability outcome.15 But many other distributions will do the 
same.  One would only expect a distribution to diverge signifi-
cantly in its results if it were systematically correlated with the 
hyperbola-shaped bands, e.g., higher in value over dark bands 
and lower over the white bands, or very sharply peaked around 
a certain specific IC value in the middle of one of the bands. 
The coin flip case illustrates the basic idea, of 
which we will now briefly look at two refinements. 
1. Stochastic nomological machines.  The Humean ac-
count of chance that I favor considers all objective prob-
abilities to be grounded, ultimately, in facts about the 
Humean mosaic.  Particularly important are facts about 
the patterns and frequencies of various types of events, 
of course.  And if we think about the features of the 
Humean mosaic at a microscopic level, one very import-
ant fact stands out: for oft-repeated types of situations 
or setups which involve outcomes determined partly or 
wholly by the (relatively) microscopic initial conditions 
of the components of the setup, it seems to be the case 
that the patterns of the actual values of those IC’s are 
usually “noisy” or random-looking, while approximat-
ing some overall smoothly-varying distribution.  (One 
example of this is the ubiquitous Gaussian or bell-curve 
distribution, characteristic of so many micro- and mac-
ro-level phenomena.)  In (Hoefer 2007) I named this 
apparent fact about our world the ‘Stochasticity Postu-
late’ (SP).16  For many types of system, the way that the 
IC’s determine or partly-determine the outcome of the 
chance setup entails that (random-looking IC’s IN → 
random-looking outcomes OUT), i.e. stable probabilistic 
regularity, just as we saw for the coin flip case.  Adapting 
Cartwright (1999)’s notion of a ‘nomological machine’, I 
call these sorts of systems ‘stochastic nomological ma-
chines’ (SNM’s).  All the usual classical gambling devic-
es can be considered stochastic nomological machines, 
and perhaps also many other phenomena where we 
are inclined to attribute stable objective probabilities. 
The ground of the objective chances is not a primitive-
ly chancy disposition, but rather a ubiquitous fact in 
our HM about how IC’s tend to be distributed in ran-
dom-looking ways, and results determined determinis-
tically or quasi-deterministically from those IC’s. Strev-
ens (1998, 2003) provides an extended treatment of this 
way in which chance can be grounded in determinism. 
2. Epistemic chances (Myrvold).  In some recent works, 
Wayne Myrvold (see 2012, 2016) proposes to ground the 
objective probabilities of Statistical Mechanics, as well 
as the classical gambling-type systems such as coin flips 
or wheels of fortune, on the same basic facts we have 
seen just above.  The difference in Myrvold’s approach 
is that he does not directly ground the objectivity of his 
chances on what I called the Stochasticity Postulate, but 
rather on facts about how SNM’s are structurally such 
as to force rational agents’ subjective degrees of be-
lief (or ‘credences’) about outcomes into agreement.17
The idea is that, for certain systems, a wide range of proba-
bility distributions [over IC’s] will be taken, via the dynam-
ics of the system, into distributions that yield approximately 
the same probabilities for some statements about the system. 
Poincaré called the input probability distributions “conven-
tions,” which leaves their status unclear.  In this paper, we 
take up a suggestion of Savage (1973), that these be regard-
ed as subjective probabilities. The idea is that the evolution of 
the system can wash out considerable differences in credences 
about the initial state, if we restrict ourselves, not to all prop-
ositions about the system at a later time, but a limited class of 
them.  Typically the propositions of interest will be those whose 
truth-values can be ascertained via feasible measurements. […] 
If it so happens that the dynamics of the situation wash out 
differences between credence-functions of any two reason-
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15 - Actually not quite 50%/50%. Diaconis et al. op cit. show that there is a slight bias of near 1% in favor of heads, if the coins start with heads facing up; hence the title of their 
article.
16 - I chose the potentially misleading term ‘postulate’ because it is meant to be a fact about IC’s all over the world at all times, and we only have direct evidence for it being the case 
around here (cosmically speaking) and in our past light cone.
17 - Myrvold prefers to reserve the term ‘objective chance’ for the kind of probability, if any, that involves intrinsic and fundamental indeterminism; in other words, primitive 
propensities or chancy laws.  In addition to ‘epistemic chances’, Myrvold also uses the term ‘almost objective probabilities’ for the determinism-based probabilities we are discus-
sing here. 
40
N° 1   2016
Vol. 3
able agents, with regards to the results of feasible experiments, 
we cannot come to this conclusion on the basis of either epis-
temic considerations or physical considerations alone.  On the 
epistemic side, we require a restriction to a class of probabili-
ty-functions that can represent the belief-states of reasonable 
agents with limited access to information about the system, and 
we require a limitation to certain sorts of measurements, since, 
for an isolated system, no invertible dynamics will wash out all 
differences between probability functions.  On the physical side, 
we need the right sort of dynamics.  If it is the case that the dy-
namics lead to probability distributions that yield approximately 
the same probabilities for the results of certain measurements, 
given as input any reasonable credence-function, then the val-
ues of these probabilities will be a matter of physics.  We will 
call the probabilities that emerge in such a scenario almost 
objective probabilities, or epistemic chances. (2012, pp. 2-3).
An important question about the idea of grounding objective 
chances on underlying determinism is this: what about the 
chances of quantum physics?  They are surely among the best, 
if not the best, candidates for being truly objective chances in 
the world.  But conventional wisdom has it that quantum phys-
ics is intrinsically and fundamentally indeterministic.  Is there 
a way to base quantum chances on underlying determinism?
 
The answer is: it’s too early to tell.  Nowadays most physicists 
and philosophers of physics have become aware of the alter-
native version of non-relativistic QM known as “Bohmian 
mechanics” (BM), discovered by David Bohm in 1952.  In that 
theory all particles have definite, precise positions at all times, 
their trajectories over time being determined fully by the quan-
tum state (or “wave function”), which evolves deterministi-
cally according to the Schrödinger equation, and the equally 
deterministic “guidance equation” postulated by Bohm.  The 
details of Bohmian mechanics are beyond our scope here, but 
it is noteworthy that it makes all the same predictions as stan-
dard QM, if we add one further postulate: the “quantum equi-
librium hypothesis”, which basically says that the initial posi-
tions of all particles are spatially distributed in proportion to 
the size of the square of the wave function.  It can be proven 
that once this condition is in place, future evolution of the 
particle positions will maintain the condition; and that, giv-
en this condition, the predictions of Bohmian mechanics are 
empirically indistinguishable from those of standard QM.18
   
Using Bohmian Mechanics, even the most striking exam-
ples of apparently primitive propensity-type chances can be 
brought back under the sway of determinism.  This is so for 
radioactive decay (cited by Suárez (2013) in his defense of a 
propensity-based view of chance), and for the spin measure-
ments example of Emery’s “paradigm case”.19  The illustra-
tion below, borrowed from (2014), shows how Bohmian me-
chanics can explain a regularity like Emery’s (6).  Particles 
with initial vertical position above a certain line will get de-
flected upward, those with positions below that line will go 
downward; and as long as the particle initial positions are 
distributed randomly but in rough concordance with the 
weights given by |Psi2 |, the frequencies of upward deflec-
tions will be in good accord with the quantum probabilities.
Figure 4: Initial positions of Bohmian silver atoms determine 
subsequent trajectory, from (Norsen 2013).
The quantum equilibrium hypothesis can be thought of as 
an allied condition complementing the Stochasticity Pos-
tulate in a Humean understanding of quantum chances. 
In this way, the Humean approach fits nicely with Bohmi-
an mechanics.  It is not clear whether the same is true for 
Myrvold’s epistemic chances.  In order for the probabilities 
given in BM to be epistemic chances in Myrvold’s sense, it 
would have to be the case that starting from a huge variety 
of subjective probability distributions over the initial con-
ditions for particle positions, the dynamics of BM forces 
those distributions quickly to be nearly identical to those 
of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis.  To my knowl-
edge, no general result of this kind has yet been proven. 
Conceptual objections can be raised against BM, however (as 
is true of all versions and interpretations of QM), and more 
importantly, there is at present no widely endorsed, deter-
ministic BM-like alternative to quantum field theories such 
as QED and QCD.  So it is unclear whether quantum chanc-
es can be entirely grounded on underlying determinism.
  
But let’s suppose for a moment that the Bohmian program 
proves extendible to cover quantum field theories, and 
thus that we can imagine that perhaps all chancy-look-
ing quantum phenomena turn out to be explicable on the 
basis of a deterministic Bohmian physical theory plus ap-
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18 - See (Dürr et al. 1992).
19 - Emery is perfectly aware of the possibility of a Bohm-type explanation of spin measurement results, and makes her explicit no-hidden-variable stipulation precisely to rule 
out such an explanation.  Her view is, therefore, not that only primitive or propensity-type chances can explain stable frequencies like those of her (6), but that if we have ruled 
out all other possible explanations based on “hidden variables” in the broadest possible sense, then we still need an explanation of the regularity and positing primitive chances, 
as in her (5), can supply one.
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propriate “random-looking initial conditions” assump-
tions.  Would we then have simply another possible ex-
planation of such phenomena, a rival to stand alongside 
the postulation of primitive propensities or chancy quan-
tum laws?  Or would we rather have a better explana-
tion, and hence the apparent winner in the game of IBE? 
I believe the latter is the correct answer, given the prob-
lems of chance primitivism discussed in the first parts of 
this paper.  But against this claim, the following objection 
may be raised: the determinist explanation here is real-
ly no explanation at all, because it just pushes the mystery 
over into the facts about initial conditions.  Why are ini-
tial conditions in our world so reliably random-looking, 
as the Stochasticity Postulate asserts?  Don’t we now need 
an explanation of that fact; and might we need to invoke 
primitive chanciness to get that explanation, after all?20
   
I have no definitive response to this objection, but there are a 
few things that can be said.  First of all, it is an accepted truism 
in philosophy of science that demands for explanation can al-
ways be raised at a new level, once an explanation has been 
offered at one level.  Newton’s theory of gravity explained the 
orbits of the planets; but one can still ask why it is a law that 
all massive bodies attract each other in proportion to their 
masses and in inverse proportion to the square of the dis-
tance between them, rather than according to some different 
mathematical formula.  Explanation always runs out at some 
point, but usually this does not make us feel that the extra lev-
el or levels of explanation that science often gives us have no 
value.  Second, although stopping once we reach a fundamen-
tal law may feel less unsatisfactory than stopping at a brute 
fact about initial conditions, a number of philosophers would 
argue that we should try to shake off that feeling.  Initial con-
ditions, especially those of the universe as a whole, are both 
explanatorily unavoidable posits, and not appropriate targets 
for further explanatory demand.  (See (Callender 2004) for 
a defense of this perspective.)  And finally, we can note that 
the general character of the initial conditions posited by my 
Stochasticity Postulate involves nothing particularly special 
or contrived; quite the opposite, they are conditions that can 
be described as ‘typical’, in a mathematically precise sense. 
There are philosophers working on both classical Statistical 
Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics who try to use consid-
erations of the typicality of initial conditions that give rise 
to the normal/expected behavior to argue that these sciences 
do offer impeccable explanations of such behavior.21  I do not 
want to endorse this line myself, but it is something to be kept 
in mind when considering whether it is a defect of determin-
istic explanations of chancy-looking physical systems that 
they have to make an assumption about initial conditions.
5 – Conclusion
In this article I have tried to induce the reader to see that it 
is deeply puzzling what we could be doing when we postulate 
primitive propensity-type chances or fundamental/irreduc-
ible chancy laws of nature.  I presented what I think of as 
the dialectics of primitive chance, showing that every natural 
attempt to explain what the meaning of primitive chance-as-
cribing statements could be fails.  Many of us feel strongly 
that we do understand the meanings of such statements, but 
it turns out that that feeling relies on taking primitive chanc-
es to be apt for guiding belief and action via the Principal 
Principle; and there is no way for the primitivist to justify 
plugging her primitive chances into PP.  Primitive chances, 
then, cannot be posited by an inference to the best explana-
tion argument, because their status as explainers of chancy 
phenomena is entirely obscure.
But even if the problems raised in the first parts of the paper 
are dismissed, I pointed out that one can well contest whether 
primitive chances give us the best explanation of the objective 
probabilities we usually ascribe to the world, because deriv-
ing those probabilities from underlying determinism pro-
vides a straightforward and clear explanation, without having 
to admit any obscure new primitives into our scientific image 
of the world.  This is so, at least, for many classical gambling 
device probabilities, for Statistical Mechanics probabilities 
(see (Frigg and Hoefer 2015)), and for the probabilities of 
non-relativistic QM via Bohmian Mechanics.  Whether the 
program of basing all physical objective chances on underly-
ing determinism can be extended to all quantum phenomena 
is still uncertain. But it is a possibility that holds out hope for 
those of us, like myself, who have real problems understand-
ing the alternative of primitive propensity-type chances. 
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